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abStract
Democracy in Spain is embedded in a typical configuration of institutional elements characteristic of the Spanish 
state organization and culture that have been determined by its particular political history, but are comparable to 
other European states. However, it is not easy to categorize Spain clearly into a single state tradition model. Recent 
transformations have meant a complete redistribution of power and a rescaling of the traditional Spanish state 
institutions. The Spanish model of subnational democracy has evolved parallel to the consolidation of the first 
successful experience of liberal democracy occurred at the national level during the last thirty years. Democracy at 
the subnational level has been influenced by the state tradition, but at the same time has transformed its structure 
and the behaviour of political actors from a consensual towards a more majoritarian model. This has been done 
alongside far-reaching decentralization and the emergence of particular regional democratic institutions, party 
systems, welfare state policies and the recovering of local self-government.
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1. iNtroductioN: tHe HiStory of tHe democratic State iN SpaiN 
Liberalism arrived early in Spain with the 1812 Constitution, which followed the War of 
Independence against the Napoleonic occupation. But the Constitution was influenced by the 
very country – Revolutionary and Napoleonic France – against which Spain was fighting, and 
it proclaimed the idea of national sovereignty and universal male suffrage. Spanish liberalism, 
however, was weak and had several peculiarities. It had to struggle during the whole nineteenth 
century with the supporters of the ancient regime —absolutists and Catholic traditionalists 
concentrated in some of the north-eastern territories. This meant that, although the moderate 
liberals who dominated the second third of the century favoured state centralization and created 
provinces on the model of the French départements in 1833, they failed to abolish some of 
the ancien régime privileges or charters (fueros) in such territories as the Basque Country and 
Navarre. Instead, they formed alliances with the local nobilities and bourgeoisies, who retained 
some special institutions and tax exemptions. Hence, there was never a true Spanish liberal 
Jacobinism seeking to overcome the remains of the ancien régime in several of the provinces 
(González Antón 2007). Centralism remained at the formal level but in practice localism 
prevailed. Liberal progressives, republicans and democrats were excluded from government 
for most of the century and when they came to power after the 1868 Revolution many of them 
also supported a more ‘girondin’ vision based on the old liberties of the old provinces and 
kingdoms as the basis of the Spanish democratic tradition. In contrast, other republicans and 
socialist parties would identify democracy with a new centralized state against the forces of the 
old regime. These forces would attack the First Republic again in the 1870s, with the second 
Carlist war (Nuñez-Seixas 2008).
Regarding the evolution of the Spanish nation-state, moderate liberalism initiated a state-
building project similar to other European countries, modelled on the French state. During 
the long reign of Isabel II, they carried out some codification, economic integration, building 
of infrastructures and creation of national symbols. An example of those measures was the 
unification of the law, the first criminal code of 1844 and 1870, the Civil Code (1855 and 1880), 
the unification of the tax system (1845) and of the currency (1868). Also, the enactment of the 
first laws on education and the creation of the Guardia Civil (1844) as a state-wide police corps 
(Moral 2007). However, by mid-century the Spanish state showed many weaknesses and a 
chronic fiscal crisis due to several factors. These were, for instance, the devastating effects of 
the War of Independence, the loss of its empire and naval power, with the related loss of trade 
benefits from the colonies, and the several internal wars against the proabsolutist ‘Carlists’ 
in the 1830s. That meant the state inherited several shortcomings compared to other large 
European states: it was inefficient, small, with an incompetent and clientelistic administrative 
apparatus and public services that emerged much later than in western and northern European 
countries. It also suffered from a typical lack of legitimacy, being opposed first by absolutists 
and the Church, then by republicans and then by socialist, anarchist and regionalist movements. 
It thus failed to produce a liberal-democratic concept of state citizenship and experienced many 
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episodes of political violence. Revolutions and changes of governments and constitutions were 
almost always carried out through the intervention of the military, which became the instrument 
of the liberal and the democratic revolutions (Genieys 2004; Diamandouros et al. 2006, Vincent 
2007).
Despite the existence of a clear Spanish nationalism shared by the liberal and pro-absolutist 
elites, during the nineteenth century no systematic nation-building or political socialization 
project or ideology accompanied the liberal state-building that could mobilize the population 
around a common national project or around a now lost colonial empire. Due to the on-going 
fiscal crisis, neither the army nor public education were able to nationalize the masses around a 
liberal national ideology. The army was inefficient and expensive, with politicized officials with 
no clear external mission or war. It turned to internal enemies such as Carlism — later reconciled 
and integrated after the compromises that ended the Carlist wars—and to the working class 
and regionalists. Public education was underfunded, totally controlled by the Church, which 
traditionally opposed liberalism, and left to financially poor local authorities (Sepulveda 2002, 
Muñoz Machado 2006).
Nationalization of the masses was weak compared to France, but it was not more problematic 
than in Germany, Britain or Italy, let alone Austria-Hungary. In any case, this relative weakness 
of nation-building and of the Spanish state capacity to operate effectively coincided with, and 
reinforced, the persistence of cultural and institutional particularisms and traditionally strong 
local identities and languages. Several economic and social circumstances such as a differential 
industrialization in Catalonia and the Basque Country would combine with socio-cultural 
differences to lead to the emergence of regionalisms, and later nationalisms in several territories. 
Their elites based autonomy claims on the idealization of their alleged historical institutions 
and medieval liberties and immunities under the Spanish monarchy. Sub-state nationalism thus 
rose simultaneously with the extension of a Spanish national identity in all the country that, 
as in other European countries, gathered strength as national markets grew, as urbanization 
progressed and systems of transport and mass communication developed (Fusi 1990). By the 
end of the century, there existed already a Spanish liberal national discourse and a national 
public sphere shared by the liberals and the republicans, but also by the labour movement. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, with the loss of the last remnants of the Spanish 
Empire and the disastrous war against the US, emerging regionalist elites mainly in Catalonia 
complained about the inability of the Spanish state to defend their economic interests. As a 
result, regionalist claims transformed into nationalist movements, proposing alternative nation-
building projects and at the same time seeking to participate and reform the Spanish political 
system through their own parties (De Blas 2007).
As regards the evolution of liberal-democratic institutions and ideas, democratic revolutions 
similar to those in the continent did not occur in Spain until the end of the 1860s. Progressive 
liberals and republican democrats produced the 1869 constitution. After much instability, both 
unitarist and federalist republicans attempted a more advanced short-lived constitutional federal 
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republic. It produced a federal constitutional project in 1873 that was never approved. This 
regime failed to consolidate and ended in social chaos, with several presidents in less than 
two years. Some of the liberal-democratic achievements of this revolution were consolidated 
after 1876 with the new liberal constitutional Restoration monarchy. This constitution, which 
lasted until 1931, was based on a notion of shared sovereignty between the parliament and the 
king and a system of patronage and organized elections by the liberal and conservative parties. 
These parties would secure alternating parliamentary majorities through electoral manipulation 
and fraud, using a clientelistic network of local notables –caciquismo— This system, not 
very different from similar arrangements in other European countries at that time, promoted 
nonetheless constitutional government, parliamentarianism, and stability during several decades 
(Juliá 1995; Moreno 2007).
Male universal suffrage, freedom of speech and association were not effectively consolidated 
until the 1890s, with the liberal governments in office (Varela 1997), but after that, there were 
also long periods of exceptional rule and suspension of rights to repress the labour movement, 
partly due to the anarchist use of terrorism, which killed several Spanish prime ministers at 
the turn of the century. Growing political instability and permanent social unrest and political 
violence led the king to support the military dictatorship initiated with the coup of Primo de 
Rivera in the 1920s.
In this sense, the transition from liberalism to democracy, which occurred peacefully and 
gradually in other European countries at the turn of the century, was frustrated in Spain. This 
was due to the erosion of the constitutional parties of the Restoration and the lack of continuity 
of a liberal political class, the absence of a Catholic democratic party committed to liberal 
democracy and the virtual exclusion from the parliament of the groups outside the system 
—republicans, regionalists and the labour movement— either through the organized electoral 
manipulation, or through the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s. Besides that, 
the labour movement was dominated by anarchist and revolutionary Marxist movements, which 
were not committed to elections, parliamentarianism, or liberal democracy either. The limits of 
suffrage and the exclusion of these groups prevented the creation of a party system similar to 
other continental countries. The opposition of republicans, left parties and regionalists to the 
Restoration monarchy, for them a corrupt democracy, and then to the military dictatorship, and 
their criticism of the state and the monarchy, led them to ally to promote the instauration of the 
Second Republic in 1931.
The Second Republic introduced female suffrage in 1933 and an advanced democratic constitution 
in terms of democratic rights. It allowed for decentralization and the integration of the new 
urban middle classes and workers into the system. As in other periods, and as a reaction to the 
centralism and authoritarianism of previous regimes, democracy was identified with territorial 
autonomy and cultural recognition, and the forces that sustained the republic came mainly from 
the left and from sub-state nationalisms and small centre-republican parties (Townson 2001). 
The Republic, however, showed the difficulties of a shaky liberal democracy in Spain supported 
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by weak social bases. The fragmentation and polarization of its party system, and its enemies 
on the left and the right made it vulnerable again to military intervention (Álvarez Tardío 2005). 
This time the coup provoked a horrific civil war, which would be the prelude of WW II in the 
rest of Europe and eventually large parts of the world, and extinguished liberal democracy 
during the long dictatorship of Franco lasting from 1939 to 1976.
The transition to democracy in 1977 and its consolidation in the early 1980s required the 
combined action of elites and civil society with a skilful leadership through a process of 
‘crystallization’ of institutions and new patterns of behaviour originated during the economic and 
cultural modernization phase in the 1960s. It also implied the conscious willingness of avoiding 
the mistakes considered to have led to the demise of democracy and to civil war in the 1930s 
(Juliá 1994; Gunther et al. 2004). The design of new institutions, together with the moderation 
and demobilization of the mass movements and the support of parties both from the left and 
the right and regional nationalists, served as a necessary condition of the successful negotiation 
and accommodation between elites of a new constitution which somewhat ‘refounded’ Spanish 
democracy and the Spanish state (Powell 2001; Tusell 2007).
The new 1978 Spanish constitution would embrace democracy, rule of law, cultural pluralism 
and the welfare state as their main values. It was intended by its founding fathers to promote 
political stability and the prevention of conflict and polarization. Issues where complete 
agreement could not be reached were dealt with through ambiguous formulas, to be resolved when 
democracy was fully consolidated. It restructured the traditional Spanish state by identifying 
democracy with regional and local autonomy thus creating the basis of new constitutionally 
protected local self-government and regional democracies. By recognizing nationalities and 
regions throughout the Spanish territory, it responded to old aspirations of autonomy not just in 
the territories with nationalist movements but in all of them. At the same time, the process still 
followed the old Spanish familiar pattern of constitutional pacts with territorial local elites. In 
this case, a new pact was made with nationalist elites of the Basque Country that recognized 
pre-constitutional historical rights giving special fiscal powers to their territories in return from 
their acceptance of the constitution and the relinquishing of political violence. At any rate, it 
was the first constitution that elicited high popular consensus and legitimacy and the only one 
to have allowed a true liberal democracy to flourish in Spain.
2. tHe iNStitutioNal expreSSioN of democracy. State traditioN aNd 
model of democracy
Democracy in Spain is embedded in a typical configuration of institutional elements characteristic 
of the Spanish state organization and culture that have been determined by its particular political 
history, but are comparable to other European states. However, it is not easy to categorize 
Spain clearly into a single state tradition model. Recent transformations have meant a complete 
redistribution of power and a rescaling of the traditional Spanish state institutions. A modern 
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welfare state has been built in the process virtually from scratch in the last 30 years. Welfare 
state institutions and policies have been essentially operated by subnational governments. 
Accordingly, regions and local governments have come to control more 50 per cent of public 
expenditure and have 73 per cent of public employees in the country. Due to this restructuring 
since the beginning of the democratization period, it shows now a mixture of traits from the 
Napoleonic and the Germanic state traditions (Loughlin and Peters 1997).
Regarding the Napoleonic features, many of them were explicitly imported from France during 
the nineteenth century. For example, legalism and the important role of civil servants corps 
and administrative law as a separate body that regulates all public life, the rights and duties of 
citizens, and at the same time safeguards them from the undue action of public administration. 
The Spanish state had been characterized until the end of the 1970s by a centralized bureaucracy, 
a prefectoral system organized in provinces, the supervision of local governments by central 
government, and a role for national career civil servants as separate bodies at all levels. It had 
also featured a largely legal technocratic policy style and a typical public law approach towards 
the everyday management and the study of public administration. Most, but not all, of these 
traits have eroded, or evolved, with the creation of Autonomous Communities (ACs) and the 
devolution of powers and resources to them (Parrado 2008).
The state has clearly been transformed in the direction of the Germanic state tradition, even if 
paradoxically, some of the Napoleonic traits have remained entrenched in the new established 
regional governments. For example, legalism, centralized administration at the regional capitals, 
largely prefectoral organization in their territories, or the informal dominance or supervision over 
local governments, which have repeatedly been denied additional legislative or implementing 
powers and resources by regional governments. That means that the form of political organization 
of the Spanish state, which experimented with some asymmetrical devolution during the 
Second Republic in the 1930s but remained a unitary state, has evolved towards a composite or 
federative state. This has occurred through the constitutional entrenchment of regional and local 
autonomy, and the entrenchment of some asymmetries in certain territories that remind more of 
the Anglo-Saxon than the Germanic tradition (Aja 2001; Watts 2009).
The form of decentralization has thus evolved from some asymmetrical devolution towards 
a kind co-operative federalism with shared competences and revenues in most policy areas, 
alongside weak local autonomy in practice. Despite the considerable devolution process, 
the central Spanish government maintains a relevant concurrent legislative role and its own 
state-wide implementation network for some policies such as social security, public order, 
infrastructures, tax collection (with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre). That 
has led to efforts at rationalizing its central and deconcentrated administrative organization and 
co-ordinate with regional and local administrations to deliver public services (Parrado 2008).
Regarding state-society relations, the Spanish state tradition also presents a mixed picture. They 
have oscillated between organicist and corporatist. The Spanish state attributes itself a central 
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role in integrating society and intervening in most areas of civil society, but at the same time 
being unable to perform adequately and respond to their demands due to its traditional lack of 
resources. This interventionist role has traditionally led to the dominance of corporatist interest 
intermediation over pluralistic access to decision-making processes and has been shifted to 
the role of political parties as only or main intermediaries between citizens and the state. This 
particular Spanish state tradition may have influenced the theory and practice of democracy by 
citizens and authorities, both in the legislative and the executive branches at the national and 
subnational levels. For example, state interventionism, the political culture of so-called ‘cynical 
statism’ of most of the population —a general complaint about government alongside an intense 
preference for public provision of services and policies—, and the legalistic and hierarchical 
conception of the role of governments, combined with the recent strong ‘colonization’ by parties 
of most state bodies, for example, the Council of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Court.
We may try to categorize the structures and practices of Spanish democracy, as it has developed 
in the last thirty years, using the famous Lijphart typology of Westminster and consensus 
models of democracy. Spain does not lend itself easily to classification in this respect either. 
Due to the combination of institutional traits developed with the recent transformation and to 
the workings of several informal elements that operate differently in different periods, it is 
difficult to assign Spain consistently into one of Lijphart’s ideal types. What seems clear is that 
Spanish democracy shows, at least in their formal arrangements, a combination of predominant 
majoritarian features in the executive–parties dimension with a consensual configuration in the 
federal–unitary dimension.
In the executive–parties dimension, all features are clearly majoritarian except the interest-
group system, which showed punctuated periods of corporatist concertation during the transition 
years. If we look at the other characteristics, Spanish democracy shows a clear concentration of 
executive power in single-party majority cabinets, without having experienced a single executive 
coalition. Even in the case of minority government, the most frequent situation in the Spanish 
parliament, central governments dispose of both political and constitutional resources that make 
them able to govern as if they had a majority (Ajenjo and Molina 2009). The executive, in 
particular the prime minister, is dominant in executive legislative relationships. This produces 
a comparatively high stability of governments and a loss of influence of parliament. Several 
factors account for this dominance, the discretion of the prime minister to appoint his cabinet 
- not accountable to parliament - the rules on the parliamentary groups promoting total party 
discipline, and the existence of the constructive non-confidence vote, taken from the German 
Constitution, requiring an absolute majority. That means that all the opposition groups have to 
agree to support an alternative candidate before ousting a prime minister (Field and Hamman 
2008).
In addition, the electoral law, theoretically proportional but with clear disproportional effects, 
due to the small size of most constituencies - half of them working as in a purely majoritarian 
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system - has shaped a largely bipolar and highly stable party system. This has produced a 
restraint on competition and a low partisan polarization and fragmentation. Third parties at 
the national level have been gradually disappearing. Besides, despite the consensus-seeking 
behaviour and the moderation of elites typical of the first years of transition, party politics and 
competition since the mid-1990s have been evolving very clearly towards adversarial politics 
and high polarization between the two main state-wide parties typical of some majoritarian 
democracies (Hopkin 2005; González and Bouza 2009). Polarization of the media, the conscious 
negativism of campaigning strategies, and the personalization of politics have reinforced this 
trend (Sampedro and Seoane 2008). In the other hand, this Spanish form of majoritarianism 
is occasionally tempered by some informal practices. These are the informal parliamentary 
coalitions with small or non-state-wide parties, the existence of certain conventions in the 
workings of parliament, and partisan proportionality in the election or appointment of members 
of constitutional bodies. Parliamentary collaboration among all groups has also remained 
usual regarding legislation on basic institutional rules, if not so much in policy sector-specific 
legislation (Gunther et al. 2004; Field and Hamman 2008).
If we turn to the federal–unitary dimension, we find more similarities with consensual 
democracies, since Spain displays features of federal and decentralized government, a rigid 
constitution that may be changed only by supermajorities and two consecutive legislatures; 
strong judicial review of constitutionality through courts and a Constitutional Tribunal, and 
an independent central bank typical of the consensus model. It also has a second chamber, 
the Senate, which although clearly not powerful, may have some scrutiny and control role. 
It has only suspensive veto capacity and is subordinated in most issues to the Congress of 
Deputies. Since 2004, however, the Senate’s party composition has been different to that in the 
Congress, with the main opposition parties - the People’s Party and Catalan nationalists - able 
to veto legislation passed by the lower chamber if allied against the government. The Senate has 
returned the national budget bill to the Congress in 2004, 2007 and 2008. Even in these cases, 
the Congress has been able to override the veto by negotiating a majority vote with different 
groups.
Following the typology proposed by Hendriks (see introduction), we should also seek to look 
at whether decisions are made in an aggregative versus an integrative fashion, and at the role 
of the institutions and preferences for representative democracy versus direct involvement of 
citizens in decision making. We should also consider other informal behavioural elements and 
their contrast with the formal arrangements and regulations. From the discussion above, it seems 
clear that most decisions are taken in an aggregative process, even if for some institutional 
policy decisions there is a tradition of reaching the widest possible agreement through a typical 
consensus-building process between elites more typical of integrative democracy. 
Maybe as a consequence of past experiences with democracy and the way the transition was 
accomplished, stability and governability seem to be more valued by politicians and citizens 
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alike than representativeness and inclusiveness of all minorities and groups. This has been 
reflected in the reinforcement of executives and the parties’ centralization. Some of the problems 
of aggregative or majoritarian decision-making, such as the possible representational bias 
regarding some cleavages, have been avoided, however, through informal arrangements or due 
to the effects of the electoral formula. These have worked well to allow fair representation of 
the two main cleavages, the territorial one –through fair representation of sub-state nationalist 
and regionalist parties— and the left-right one within state institutions –with the incorporation 
of labour through left parties and the alternation in office— (Field and Hamman 2008). Third 
national parties with a spread vote, however, as an unintended effect of the electoral system, 
may be said to be unfairly represented.
As regards representative versus direct democracy, we should distinguish between the rules 
and the reality. The 1978 Spanish Constitution mandates the government “to facilitate the 
participation of all citizens in political life” and establishes the right of citizens to participate 
in public affairs, not only through representatives but also directly. It regulates the so-called 
citizens or popular legislative initiative and the possibility of consultative referendum on policy 
decisions. It recognizes the direct-democratic system of open council for small municipalities 
and the obligation of public authorities to listen to organizations and users, the right of teachers, 
parents, and students in the control and management of schools, etc. Other national regulations 
appeal to the principles and forms of citizen participation, such as procedural administrative 
laws, laws on Local Government and the regional Statutes of Autonomy, especially of the most 
recent generation (Aguiar 2000; Sánchez Morón 2008).
The practice of democracy at the national level, however, differs strongly from these rules 
and is characterized by the domination of representative democracy, especially through the 
monopoly of political parties in the institutional arena coupled with a relatively high turnout in 
national and subnational elections. Political participation and party and union membership have 
remained low despite political and social and value changes (Torcal et al 2005; Morales 2005; 
Mota 2006). Socialization during the dictatorship, where lack of civil and political liberties led 
to total privatization of life and feelings of apathy and lack of trust, may explain this. Despite 
very high and stable support for democracy, not affected by its performance, the transitional 
way of elite accommodation may have reinforced for many observers a political culture of 
disaffection (Benedicto 2004). As both citizens and parliamentary representatives recognize, it 
is clear that despite regulations supporting the involvement of citizens, there is low participation 
and a low wish to participate (Martínez 2006).
At the same time, institutional design decisions about the electoral system and the party funding 
regulations reinforced parties. Furthermore, the internal life of most parties has also prevented 
party members’ involvement despite some attempts to use primary elections within them and the 
decentralization in regional party organizations. The late arrival of Spanish democracy would 
explain some of these peculiarities, such as weak party membership, and others such as the 
comparatively high influence of television and other media in voters, the ‘presidentialization’ 
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of the executive power and the increasing cartelization of the political parties. Spain did not 
experience the rise of mass and catch-all parties in the mid-20th century, and leaped straight to 
a later stage, more dominated by individualism, post-materialism, or what has been called the 
Americanization of Spanish politics (Magone 2009).
In sum, this mostly aggregative process and its representative or indirect democratic nature 
produces a typical model of pendulum democracy (Hendriks) in which power alternates between 
two parties, and where citizens periodically cast their votes and hand over legislative powers 
to their elected representatives. These produce mostly single-party cabinets that take their own 
decisions and make policies on their own, which may be reversed or changed by the in-coming 
government. Although with consistently high turnout, citizens limit themselves to participate in 
elections. Participation will be higher or lower depending on polarization and the main issues 
involved. This pendulum democracy may occasionally be tempered by some informal elements 
of a more integrative nature and by some direct formal elements contemplated in the national 
and regional laws.
3. tHe iNStitutioNal expreSSioN of SubNatioNal democracy
The institutional framework of subnational authorities
Spain is composed of seventeen Autonomous Communities (ACs) with constitutionally 
entrenched autonomy, whose legislative assemblies are directly elected by their citizens. All 
of the ACs have adopted parliamentary systems in which regional presidents and governments 
are politically responsible to regional parliaments.
Table 1. The number of inhabitants in Autonomous Communities (2008) 
SPAIN 46,157,822
Andalusia 8,202,220
Aragon 1,326,918
Asturias 1,080,138
Balearic Islands 1,072,844
Basque Country 2,157,112
Canary Islands 2,075,968
Cantabria 582,138
Castille & Leon 2,557,330
Castille-La Mancha 2,043,100
Catalonia 7,364,078
Extremadura 1,097,744
Galicia 2,784,169
Madrid 6,271,638
Murcia 1,426,109
Navarre 620,377
Rioja 317,501
Valencia 5,029,601
Ceuta and Melilla 148,837
Source: INE
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In addition to the seventeen ACs, there are three types of elected local bodies in Spain: fifty 
provinces, 8,112 municipalities and ten islands (Table 1). More than two thirds of Spanish 
municipalities (71.5 per cent) have a population of less than 2,000 inhabitants; 85 per cent have 
less than 5,000 inhabitants, concentrating only 13.1 per cent of the population; 145 municipalities 
have more than 50,000 inhabitants with 52.5 per cent of the population. Twenty-four large 
municipalities of more than 250,000 have 30 per cent of the population (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 2. Range of Population Size in Municipalities. December 2008
 Municipalities Total population
 Number % Number %
0 to 2,000 5,797 71.5 2,837,647 6.1
2,000 to 5,000 1,025 12.6 3,217,354 7
5,000 to 20,000 906 11.2 8855578 19.2
20,000 to 
50,000 239 2.9 6997338 15.2
50,000 to 
500,000 139 1.7 16681191 36.1
More than 
500,000 6 0.1 7568714 16.4
 8,112 100 46157822 100
Source Ministry of Public Administration
Provinces are based on territorial divisions established in the early 19th century and comprise 
inter-municipal councils with indirectly elected provincial governments (diputaciones) and 
presidents, which assist and co-operate with municipalities ensuring the provision of local 
services to the smallest ones. During the devolution process seven provincial governments were 
merged with regional governments in those ACs formed by only one old province —Asturias, 
Cantabria, La Rioja, the Balearic Islands, Madrid, Murcia and Navarre—. The Spanish islands 
—Balearic and Canary Islands— are served by councils that perform functions similar to those 
of the continental provinces and possess some of the powers of the other ACs.
ACs have also established other subnational units of government. Catalonia and Aragon 
have been active in creating counties (comarcas) for multi-municipal servicing and planning. 
Moreover, several ACs have established 1,023 inter-municipal single or multi-purpose horizontal 
service partnerships (mancomunidades), by bringing together two or more municipalities to 
manage local public services (Agranoff 2007). Special arrangements also exist for the two 
autonomous cities in North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) and the major cities of Madrid and 
Barcelona. The metropolitan areas of Spain’s other large cities are not served by their own 
government bodies, since ACs have opposed such structures because they would compete for 
powers and functions (Alba and Navarro 2005). Nonetheless, the metropolitan areas of some 
large cities such as Barcelona and Valencia do provide different organizational structures for 
selected public services.
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Table 3. The number and types of local authorities by Autonomous Community (2009)
Autonomous  
Comunities
Municipali-
ties Provinces Islands
Sub-
municip. 
units
Mancomunidades Comar-cas
Metro-
politan 
Areas
Other Total
Andalusia 770 8 0 47 89 0 0 0 914
Aragon 731 3 0 43 62 32 0 0 871
Asturias 78 1 0 39 19 0 0 1 138
Balearic Islands 67 1 4 1 7 0 0 0 80
Basque Country 251 3 0 340 37 7 0 0 638
Canary Islands 88 2 7 0 17 0 0 0 114
Cantabria 102 1 0 524 22 0 0 0 649
Castile & Leon 2.248 9 0 2.233 244 1 0 13 4748
Castille-La Mancha 919 5 0 40 134 0 0 1 1099
Catalonia 946 4 0 58 73 41 2 0 1124
Extremadura 383 2 0 26 73 0 0 0 484
Galicia 315 4 0 9 41 0 0 0 369
Madrid 179 1 0 2 49 0 0 0 231
Murcia 45 1 0 0 8 0 0 0 54
Navarre 272 1 0 352 60 0 0 2 687
Rioja 174 1 0 4 27 0 0 0 206
Valencia 542 3 0 7 61 0 2 0 615
*** Autonomous Cities 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
TOTAL 8112 50 11 3725 1023 81 4 17 13023
Source: Registro de Entidades Locals 05/01/2009.
If we look at the executives and legislative bodies and their leaders, their electoral systems 
and financial arrangements in all these subnational governments, we should first refer to ACs, 
which comprise overall 17 legislatures with 1186 regional MPs and play an important role in 
shaping regional politics and policies. Their role, however, is conditioned by the predominance 
of regional executives (López Nieto 2004). The presidents and governments of the regional 
executives have followed the model of the central government. Regional prime ministers have 
had considerable influence in their institutional systems. This influence is greater when they 
control their party organizations and are charismatic leaders (Calvet 2007). They have important 
powers such as the appointment of regional ministers and the structure of governments thus 
leading to ‘presidentialization’ of regional governments (Magone 2009). The fact that they 
usually are the leaders of their party regional branches, along with the effects of the parliamentary 
system, has made them the main representatives of their territories’ interests and also given 
them political influence at the centre. This is particularly true when their own parties are not in 
office in central government. There have been around sixty different presidents, 80 per cent of 
whom belonged to the two main state-wide parties. In addition, a regional political class has 
developed, but there is also a high degree of circulation between regional and national political 
careers (Oñate 2006).
Regional statutes of autonomy in all ACs regulate their electoral systems and almost all of 
them have approved electoral laws that outline electoral procedures (Table 4). Regional 
electoral systems share the basic features of central regulations such as closed, blocked party 
lists, and the D’Hondt formula. The number of seats, the type and size of the districts and the 
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electoral thresholds all vary across ACs and have changed in some cases over time - all ACs 
have thresholds to win seats, although these vary between 3 and 5 per cent of valid votes. 
Overall, regional electoral systems produce more proportional effects than those of general 
elections, since 40 per cent of constituencies assign more than fifteen seats (López Nieto 2008). 
Table 4. The electoral system(s)
Elected institution Electoral rules
Congress of Deputies
350 members directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term of office. •	
Fifty provincial constituencies is entitled to an initial minimum of two seats. 
The remaining 248 seats are allocated among the fifty provinces in proportion to their •	
populations. 
Closed and blocked party lists,•	
Seats apportioned according to the largest average method of proportional •	
representation (PR) D’Hondt. 
Three percent threshold of all valid votes cast in the constituency, including blank •	
ballots.
Senate
208 Senators elected directly by voters•	
Majority system applied in provincial multi-nominal constituencies with open lists. •	
Each mainland province directly elects four Senators, Island provinces elect three •	
senators on each of the larger islands and 1 on the remaining islands or groups of 
islands. Cities of Ceuta and Melilla also directly elect two Senators each. 
56 Senators are appointed by the Legislative Assemblies of each Autonomous •	
community pursuant the procedure laid down in its own legislation.
Autonomous Communities 
Parliaments
Different number of deputies to elect (ranging Catalonia with 135 seats to La Rioja •	
with 33).
Different types of districts•	
Proportional representation with D’Hondt formula and multimember districts•	
Threshold of 3 % or 5 %of valid votes in a district•	
Local governments
Municipality is a single district with a number of councillors according to population•	
Majoritarian uninominal in small municipalities (<100), majoritarian plurinominal with •	
open lists and preferential vote (25- 250), proportional plurinominal in municipalities 
(>250)
Mayor elected by the councillors in towns of more than 5000, by the citizens assembly •	
in open council municipalities in less than 100 inhab.
If there are no majority, the head of most voted list gets elected•	
Threshold of 5% •	
Source: Own elaboration
There are two distinct funding arrangements and tax systems for the ACs: the common and the 
special or charter regimes – for the Basque Country and Navarre (Loughlin and Lux 2008). 
These two ACs have maintained particular fiscal and tax regimes, which allow them to raise 
their own taxes and negotiate a transfer to Madrid to pay for common services. This is a source 
of tension, but agreement has always been reached. The scheme causes some resentment in 
other regions, since the Basque Country and Navarre not only are able to have a higher level of 
public of regional public expenditure per capita, but they are also not integrated in the structured 
system of state-wide fiscal equalization despite being among the wealthiest regions in Spain. 
Within the common regime, ACs’ revenue autonomy has significantly increased, through both 
the devolution of some taxes and the revenue sharing of tax yields in main taxes —personal 
income, VAT— (see Table 5). The Sufficiency Fund —fiscal equalization scheme—supplements 
the gap between the funding needs of ACs and their tax capacity with the existing taxes.
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Table 5. The subnational system of finances and taxation: sources of finance Autonomous 
communities 2006
Milion euros % %
TAXES 70,587 55.7
Own taxes 1,759 1.4 
Shared taxes 68,828 54.4 
GRANTS 48,495 38.3
Sufficiency Fund 29,941 23.6 
Grants from EU 8,608 6.8 
Interterritorial 
compensation Fund 1,142 0.9 
Other grants 8,804 7.0 
BORROWING 4,898 3.9
OTHER REVENUES 7,544 2.1
Provincial revenues 191 0.2 
Fees and others 2,455 1.9 
TOTAL REVENUES 126,627 100.0
Adapted from Bosch and Vilalta (2008),
Regarding municipalities, the municipal executive is formed by the mayor (alcalde), who 
presides the full council (ayuntamiento) comprising all elected councillors. Legislation dictates 
the number of councillors according to population size. The largest cities have between twenty-
five and fifty-five councillors -in Madrid- , but around twenty-seven in most large cities. In 
Spain, there are more than 65,000 elected councillors, 50 per cent of whom are in municipalities 
with populations between 250- 5,000 and of whom 31 per cent are women. There are 8,112 
mayors, of which 15 per cent are women (see Tables 6).
Table 6. How representative local councillors are by… (Percentages)
Table 6a. Age
Councillors 03 Councillors 07
18 a 25 0.7 2.22
26 a 45 46.72 51.48
46 a 65 46.26 42.47
Más de 65 6.32 3.83
100 100
Table 6b. Gender
2003 2007
Mayors Councillors Major +Councillors Mayors Councillors Major+Councillors
Men 91.96 73.87 82.91 85 69 77
Women 8.04 26.13 17.1 15 31 23
100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 6c. Social class. Level of education
 Mayors Councillors Majors+Councillors
No education 0.34 0.47 0.405
Incompletete 6.94 6.44 6.69
Secondary 25.94 28.91 27.425
Vocational Training 12.12 13.18 12.65
High School 17.95 17.22 17.585
Pregraduate studies 18.83 15.89 17.36
Graduate studies 17.87 17.89 17.88
 100 100 100
Source: Registro de Representantes Electos (Ministry of Public Administration)
Until very recently, the full council also had many executive powers. Several reforms of national 
legislation regulating local institutions have tried to strengthen local democracy by attributing 
to the mayor more executive powers and administrative tasks, and have limited the power of 
the council to that of making strategic decisions or regulations. Reforms have given the full 
council more scrutiny and control powers over the mayor, which means local government has 
been under a process of progressive ‘parliamentarization’. These reforms have introduced the 
automatic calling of the full council, the censure motion, and the motion of confidence in the 
mayor, related to the adoption of certain decisions such as budgets, organizational regulations, 
urban planning, or financial controls (Salvador 2006). Recent attempts have also been made 
in law to decentralize local council administration through the creation of districts. So far, 
and with the exception of a few cities, councils had been reluctant to decentralize or even to 
deconcentrate their administration. A highly centralized model has prevailed with concentration 
of power in the hands of the mayor and their deputy mayors.
The political profile of the mayor has also been reinforced by transferring most of his 
administrative functions (public procurement, public services, local public employment, 
economic management, permits and authorizations, and others) to the local government board or 
cabinet, formed by several councillors supporting the mayor (Salazar 2007). Especially in large 
cities, a strong executive body has taken on most of the management functions from the mayor 
(Magre and Bertrana 2005). This has also ended with the traditional concentration of executive 
powers in the mayor and the traditional local ‘semi-presidentialist’ model, produced in practice 
by his domination of the local party structure and its independence from the national parties. 
In many cases continued electoral success and the support of the local party may maintain the 
mayor in power for many years.
The main bodies of the provincial governments are the president and vice-president of the 
provincial council (Diputación), the plenary assembly of the provincial council, formed by 
delegates of the different municipalities within the province, and the government commission, 
which supports the president, formed by several members of the provincial council (Salazar 
2007).
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The mayor is elected by the councillors in the full council, and must be a party group leader. 
Normally the mayor is the leader of the largest party but not always so. The mayor’s office lasts 
four years, unless he loses a motion of censure. The municipal electoral regulations contained 
in national framework laws, establish a procedure under which the head of the most voted list 
becomes the mayor in case that none of the party group leaders obtains a majority of votes. 
There is no possibility of dissolving the council or calling for new elections, which may produce 
instability in those cases where none of the party leaders is able to command a majority and is 
subject to repeated motions of censure or vulnerable to the effect of turncoat councillors. 
Citizens elect councillors directly through a system of closed party lists. In the case of 
municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants (934 municipalities, 11.51 per cent), subject to the 
open council regime, the mayor is elected through a majority vote in the citizens assembly. The 
same is true in the 3,814 sub-municipal units, where citizens elect sub-local mayors (alcaldes 
pedáneos) directly. For municipalities with populations between 100 and 250 inhabitants (20 
per cent of them), five councillors have to be elected through panachage1 in open lists and 
preferential vote. Councillors then elect the mayor. For municipalities with more than 250 
inhabitants (69 per cent) election of the mayor is made by the councillors in closed party lists 
and a proportional formula. Three quarters of councillors are elected in councils whose size is 
between 7 and 17 councillors, and 14 per cent in districts of five councillors. This means that the 
electoral system has effects that are more proportional in large cities and is more majoritarian in 
small municipalities. Overall it is more proportional than the national system (Delgado 2008).
The main funding for local governments comes mainly from the central government but 
since recently also from the ACs (Loughlin and Lux 2008). Revenues, however, are clearly 
insufficient, since municipal governments carry out a great deal of unfunded mandates. Despite 
this, they have more tax autonomy than regional ones, since the share of own-source revenues 
is of 60 per cent (see Table 7). These are based largely on taxes and fees related to development 
permits, building and housing, which has led to many cases of irregular financing and to an 
uncontrolled urban development.
 
1  This allows voters to choose candidates from different party lists.
eloíSa del piNo & céSar coliNo
- 19 -
Table 7. Revenue Composition of Municipalities for 2004 without borrowing 
FEES, PUBLIC PRICES AND OTHERS 28.50
MUNICIPAL TAXES 31.92
 Property Tax 16.06  
 Local Business Tax 3.04  
 Vehicle Tax 4.93  
 Tax on increased property values 2.92  
 Tax of constructions. facilities and infrastructure 4.95  
 Other 0.02  
TAX SHARING 1.82
 Personal Income Tax 0.97  
 Value Added Tax. VAT 0.6  
 Excise Duties 0.24  
GRANTS 37.76
 From Central government 20.63
 From Autonomous Communities 9.31  
 From abroad 0.67  
 From other sources 7.15  
Source: adapted from López Laborda et al. 2006
Subnational politics
Subnational politics has been dominated in the last decade, similarly to the national level, by 
the three main state-wide parties –Socialist Party (PSOE), the People’s Party (PP), and United 
Left (IU)–, and by several regional, AC-based or non-state-wide parties (Hanley and Loughlin 
2006; Verge 2007). Some of the latter have also been important in the national parliament 
(Convergencia i Unió (CiU) -, Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Canary Coalition (CC)) 
when supporting the Socialist and People’s Party minority governments (Pallarés and Keating 
2006). Non state-wide parties are in parliament or cabinets in all but five regions. In Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre and the Canary Islands they have given rise to distinct 
regional party systems. In some cases —until 2003 in Catalonia and 2009 in the Basque 
Country— they have dominated regional parliaments and cabinets from its inception. Also 
state-wide parties and their regional branches have adapted to decentralization and electoral 
competition with regional parties and have changed their organizations accordingly, gaining 
growing influence within state-wide party’s organizations and leadership.
Regarding government formation, most ACs – nine until 2009 but currently eleven - have 
single-party governments, of which nine rule with a majority (see Table 8a). The other six ACs 
are usually governed by coalition governments between state-wide and non state-wide parties 
—three dominated by non state-wide parties, Catalonia, Navarra, and Canary Islands, and three 
dominated by state-wide parties, Aragon, Cantabria, and Balearic Islands. Overall, in 46.4 per 
cent of regional elections there was a majority in parliament and government. In addition, in 
nine ACs there has been practically no alternation in government —six PP and three PSOE 
(López Nieto 2008). Catalonia and the Basque Country have alternated only after 30 years of 
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domination by nationalist parties. In twelve ACs the competition is bipartisan and in the other 
five it is multiparty, with three to five parties (Ocaña and Oñate 2006; Wilson 2009).
Table 8.a. Government Formation and Electoral Results for State-wide and Non State 
Wide Parties in the last Regional Elections
 State Parties or its regional branches
Non-State Wide Parties (% 
Votes)
Government 
formed by
Andalusia 2008 PSOE (48.1); PP (38.6); IU (7.1) PA (2.9) PSOE (Maj)
Aragon 2007 PSOE (41.03); PP (31.09); IU (4.12) PAR (12.12); CHA (8.17); 
Other (4.72)
PSOE PAR (Maj)
Asturias 2007 PP (41.8); PSOE (41.6); IU (9.8) PSOE (Min)
Balearic Islands 2007 PP (46.01); PSOE (31.75); BLOC (9.8); UM (6.75); PSOE UM PSM IU (Maj)
Basque Country 2009 PSE-EE/PSOE (30.70); PP (14.1); 
UPD (2.15);
PNV-EAJ (38.56); ARALAR 
(6.03); EA (3.6); EB-B (3.51);
PSOE (Min)
Canary Islands 2007 PSOE (34.72); PP (24.37) CC (23.36); CC PP (Maj)
Cantabria 2007 PP (41.52); PSOE (24.33) PRC (28.87) PSOE PRC (Maj)
Castile & Leon 2007 PP (49.41); PSOE (37.49); UPL (2.74) PP (Maj)
Castille-La Mancha 
2007 PSOE (51.92); PP (42.45) PSOE (Maj)
Catalonia 2006 PP (10.65)
PSC (26.82); CiU (31.53); 
Ciutadans-Partido de la 
Ciudadanía (3.03); ERC 
(14.03); ICV (9.52);
PSC ERC ICV (Maj)
Extremadura 2007 PSOE (52.9); PP (38.79) PSOE (Maj)
Galicia 2009 PP (46.68); PSOE (31.02). UPD 
(1.41);
BNG (16.01); TEGA (1.11); PP (Maj)
Madrid 2007 PP (53.3); PSOE (33.46); IU (8.89) PP (Maj)
Murcia 2007 PP (58.49); PSOE (31.81); IU (6.24) PP (Maj)
Navarre 2007 PSOE (22.4); IU (4.4) UPN (42.2); CDN (4.4); NB (23.7) UPN CDN (Min)
Rioja 2007 PP (48.74); PSOE (40.47); PR (5.95) PP (Maj)
Valencia 2007 PP (52.52); PSOE (34.49); IU-CPV (7.07) PP (Maj)
Source: Junta Electoral Central (2009) and own elaboration
Aralar (Basque Independentist Party); Bloc (Balearic Block); BNG. Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Block); Ciutadans-
Partido de la Ciudadanía (Citizens’ Party); CC. Coalición Canaria (Canary Islands Coalition); CDN. Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra 
(Navarre Democrats’ Grouping); CHA Chunta Aragonesista (Aragonesist Group); CÍU. Convergéncia i Unió (Convergence and Union); EA. 
Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity); EB Ezquerra Batua (Basque United Left); IU Izquierda Unida (United Left); IU-ICV Iniciativa per 
Catalunya-Verts (Initiative for Catalonia-The Greens); NB Nafarroa Bai (Navarra Yes); PA. Partido Andalucista (Andalusian Party); PAR. 
Partido Aragonés Regionalista (Aragonese Regionalist Party); PNV-EAJ. Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party); PP. Partido 
Popular (Popular Party); PR Partido Riojano (Riojan Party); PRC. Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (Cantabrian Regionalist Party); PSOE. 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Party); PSE-EE (Basque socialista Party; PSC Catalan Socialist Party; UM. Unión 
Mallorquina (Mallorcan Union); UPL Unión del Pueblo Leonés (Union of the Leonese People); UPN. Unión del Pueblo Navarro (Union of 
the People of Navarre); UPD Unión Progreso y Democracia (Union Progress and Democracy)
In several ACs, voting patterns may be different between general and regional elections. For 
example in the Basque Country and Catalonia a significant portion of votes go for state-wide 
parties in general elections and for nationalist parties at the regional ones. Even in those four 
regions with a different electoral calendar, the dynamics of regional politics and electoral 
competition are closely linked to those at the national level. Recent research has shown, for 
example, that those ACs do not necessarily show a distinctive issue profile in their electoral 
campaigns (Libbrecht et al. 2009). Nevertheless, one may also witness a regionalization of 
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national politics, due to the importance that non-state-wide parties have acquired for the 
stability of the government in the national parliament. Circulation of politicians among levels is 
frequent. Over 60 per cent of regional MPs were re-elected in the election of 2007, half of them 
have had prior political experience at municipal level and around 10 per cent at the national 
level — (Oñate and Delgado 2006).
The recent electoral trends signal a concentration of votes on state-wide parties or their branches 
both in national and regional elections. At present, if we consider the Catalan Socialist Party 
(PSC) as a counterpart of PSOE, sixteen ACs are governed by state-wide parties alone or in 
coalition —only Navarre is not, due to UPN’s recent tensions with its associate party PP. This 
trend has been visible in March 2008 national elections —where 89 per cent of votes (93 per 
cent of seats) went for state-wide parties— and in recent regional elections. After the Basque and 
Galician elections on 1 March 2009, nationalist parties do not have a majority in parliaments or 
control the executives in any of their traditional strongholds, with the exception of the Canary 
Islands. It is not still clear whether this reflects an underlying crisis or a momentary electoral 
retreat of regional nationalisms in Spain. In any case, it signals a clear success of state-wide 
parties and their regional branches, able to act both as national and regional parties according 
to the elections. This notwithstanding, new third parties have emerged for the first time and 
entered the national and regional parliaments, some of them campaigning on territorial issues 
(UPD and Ciutadans), which shows some disaffection with both national and sub-state existing 
parties.
At the local level, there are numerous political parties that run in the municipal elections 
alongside state-wide or regional parties. Many of them are independents, left wing radicals, 
greens, and alternatives. They may win in small towns but would normally need the support 
of one of the large state-wide or AC-based parties, which usually present candidates in all 
municipalities (Márquez 2007; Velasco 2009). They play a direct role in exercising local power, 
since local politicians are well represented within the central structures of political parties, or 
because parties deal with local matters with a supra-local perspective. Around 70 per cent of 
mayors belong to the three main state-wide parties and the rest to non-state-wide parties and to 
independent parties and citizens’ electoral groups.
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Table 8b. Municipal Elections 2007
Party Votes Share of Votes Councillors
% of 
Mayors Majorities Pluralities Tie
PP 7,915.014 36.61% 23.349 35.66 2880 472 2
PSOE 7,758.783 34.91% 24.029 28.82 2328 572 2
IU 1,216.944 5.47% 2.035 4.17 58 54
CIU 722,653 3.25% 3.384 0.72 337 116
ERC-AM 347,460 1.56% 1.594 1.29 104 37
PNV 309,625 1.39% 1.038 1.13 91 41
PAR 94,087 0.42% 982 1.89 153 35
BNG 315,449 1.42% 661 0.1 8 9
ICV-EUIA-EP 257,048 1.16% 449 0.07 6 16
PA 235,201 1.06% 526 0.21 17 7
CC-PNC 217,540 0.98% 403 0.3 24 11
EAE-ANV 94,825 0.43% 439 0.31 25 15
Rest of parties 2,318,306 10.43% 7.241 5.94 481 177
TOTAL Votes 
Parties 21,802,935 99.09% 66.130 80.61 6512 1562
Blank ballot 427,234
Void 263,515
TOTAL VOTES 22,493,684
Source: Ministry of Interior 2009. 
During the 1999-2003 period, there was a government with an absolute majority in 83.1 per 
cent of municipalities. Majority governments predominated in the smaller municipalities, while 
they decrease in middle-sized towns and especially in big cities (Salazar 2007: 163). According 
to data provided by the Ministry of Territorial Affairs, after the 2007 elections 80 per cent of 
mayors had a majority in their councils. If we look at large cities in seven local elections from 
1979-2003 an average percentage of 45.1 were elected by a majority of one party (63.5 per 
cent in 2003), 22.8 per cent had a single-party majority, and 32.1 per cent ruled in coalition. 
Of the seven largest municipalities during 2003-2007 only three managed to rule with an absolute 
majority, the rest counting on other municipal groups (Márquez 2007, 306 ff). 
These figures show a picture of a party system similar to the national and regional one and 
increasingly bipartisan. If we look at the stability of local governments and the use of censure 
motions, we know that in 2003-2006, 185 motions of censure were tabled, which is very few 
if we consider the number of municipalities. The data show that they largely occur in small 
municipalities, where political fragmentation of the municipalities is higher and where the 
parties have more difficulty in maintaining discipline in their groups. Likewise, the data show 
that cases of turncoat councillors (transfuguismo) are at the origin of less than half of the motions 
of censure (Salazar 2007). At the same time, this shows how the balance between governability 
and representativeness of the local government is accomplished by the electoral system more 
fairly than many of its critics suggest when advocating its reform.
Regarding the nationalization of local elections, until now the party winning the local elections 
has usually won the subsequent national election. For this reason, many in the parties’ campaigns 
and in the media see local elections as the first round of general elections (Magone 2009). Local 
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election turnout, at around 60 and 70 per cent, similar to regional elections but usually lower than 
national elections, has remained stable. When it has risen, it has been due to ‘nationalization of 
local politics’. Within parties, central organizations decide frequently on the candidates and the 
coalitions in municipal governments, especially regarding the big cities. On the other hand, the 
‘localization’ of national politics is less important than in other countries. For example, among 
the deputies of the lower chamber, the congress of deputies, there are eight mayors and forty-
one councillors (see Table 9). Unfortunately, we lack data on how many senators accumulate 
local and national mandates.
Table 9. Cumul des mandats among Deputies in the Lower Chamber 
(Congress of Deputies)
Mayors Councillors Major + Councillors
% of MP 2.3 11.7 14
Number 8 41 49
Source: Registro de Representantes Electos (Ministry of Public Administration)
Subnational citizenship and participation
Spanish citizens in all regions give high support to democracy as the best political system. 
Electoral turnout is very similar to other democracies such as the French, Irish or British. This 
support for democracy co-exists, however, with a widespread disaffection among citizens 
towards the political sphere. For instance, with small regional variations, only a quarter of 
Spaniards feel ‘very’ or ‘quite’ interested in politics and around three-quarters have negative 
opinions about politics and politicians. Citizens’ movements of the 1970s declined with the 
formation of a representative democracy and most of their leaders were co-opted into party 
politics, regional legislatures and local councils, joining the local and regional political classes. 
Most analysts expected that the period of political socialization in democracy would improve 
some of these attitudes inherited from the Franco dictatorship. However, after more than thirty 
years since the restoration of democracy, the resilience of some of these negative attitudes 
makes some observers pessimistic regarding the quality of democracy.
However, although Spanish civil society has traditionally been considered weak and with poor 
social capital, some recent data on associational activity, showing regional variations, allow for 
some qualifications to this perception (Montero et al. 2006; Morales 2005; Encarnación 2008). 
For instance, while the number of associations remains small in most regions, there has been 
an increase of non-political associations in many regions. Younger citizens are less involved in 
politics, but they are more oriented towards other types of association. Data on protest events, 
especially demonstrations, show very active citizens, comparable to that of other neighbouring 
democracies. Similarly, although the levels of interpersonal trust are low, they score better than 
in other advanced democracies. Some authors have suggested that social capital in the Spanish 
case is only weak when measured against the usual criteria in Anglo-Saxon studies. It could 
NatioNal aNd SubNatioNal democracy iN SpaiN: HiStory, modelS aNd cHalleNgeS
- 2
4 -
be considered much higher if more expansive criteria were used and frequent bar hoping or 
clubbing were included, as an equivalent to bowling for American case (Encarnación 2008).
Spaniards in all regions also adhere to a statist view and to a universalistic concept of the welfare 
state, with a strong emphasis on equal opportunities. Most citizens believe that the government 
should be responsible for the welfare of all citizens and around 70 per cent would rather pay 
more taxes and have more or better services, than pay less for fewer or lower quality ones 
(Del Pino 2005). In sharp contrast to the traditional view of Spaniards as having a consistently 
negative attitude and as being unsatisfied with government performance, a majority of citizens, 
with some regional variations, are ‘very’ or ‘quite’ satisfied with public services provided by 
regions and the central government (Arriba et al. 2006), although satisfaction with education 
and health has been decreasing lately.
The decentralization model of the so-called State of Autonomies (El Estado de las Autonomías) 
has high levels of support in most ACs. Nowadays more than 80 per cent of citizens have a 
dual identity or allegiance both to their AC and to Spain, identifying with the two political 
communities. Since 1976 support for centralism decreased from 43 per cent to 9 per cent 
in 2005. The percentage favouring more powers for ACs has gone from being about half of 
the population in 1984 to almost 78 per cent in 2005. At the same time, with some regional 
variations, citizens are divided in their preferences as to which level of government should 
have the responsibility for providing health and education. Most citizens would like the central 
government to retain responsibilities for pensions and social security (Del Pino and Van Ryzin 
2008). Finally, municipal governments are seen as the ones most responsive to citizens’ needs 
and as those encouraging citizen participation the most.
Subnational governments on their part have made efforts in recent years to improve instruments 
of citizen participation. They have sought to address both the improvement of public action 
and the widespread belief that there is a certain crisis of democracy. Traditional mechanisms of 
public consultation in administrative procedures are fully consolidated in Spain and function 
relatively well in issues of high public salience. Some regional governments have also created 
directorates-general in their administrations to promote citizen participation, for example 
Catalonia, Canary Islands, Valencia and Aragon. All ACs have regulated regional popular 
legislative initiatives. Catalonia for instance has introduced innovations in the number of 
signatures and holders of the right to submit it, extending to those over 18 years and residents 
with non-Spanish nationality. These mechanisms have not been used much. In the Spanish 
parliament there have been fifty-seven popular initiatives, and in the Catalan Parliaments, for 
instance, eleven, virtually all without success.
At the local level, the ‘popular municipal initiative’ was introduced in 2003. The 2003 Law 
on Modernization of Local Governments regulated standards and procedures for the effective 
participation of the residents in local affairs, both in the municipality as a whole and in the districts. 
It also provides for the improvement and modernization of the mechanisms of public consultation 
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and for municipal deconcentration in large population cities. It has regulated participation in 
strategic planning and local development policies through the creation of the Social Council of 
the City and the participation in the improvement of the municipal administration (Rodriguez 
2005). It is still soon to see the effects of these measures, but data show decreasing interest 
in participation in local politics, even where there are channels of participation, such as the 
attendance to the meetings of the council, citizens’ assemblies in the open council system or the 
possibility of following the council meetings through the broadcasting by local TV stations.
To this, we must add the very limited practice of direct democracy mechanisms provided for in 
the Constitution and other regulations. Referendums have been little used in Spain. In addition 
to the four state-level referendums in total, only seven regional referendums have been held, 
three in Andalusia, two in Catalonia and one in the Basque Country. Regarding municipalities, 
the central government has to authorize referendums. Between 1985 and March 2009, only 
twenty-six were authorized out of the 111 proposed by municipal authorities in more than 8100 
municipalities (see Table 10). In addition, the open council in municipalities with less than 100 
inhabitants has had mixed success in practice.
Table 10. Number and Type of Local Referendums en Spain (1985-2009)
AC Requested Authorized Issues involved
Andalusia 17 4
Local festivals (2), Integration of municipality 
in supramunicipal consortium (1), Facilities 
(1)
Aragon 4 1 municipal segregation
Basque Country 8 1 Dissolution of municipality 
Canary Island 4 2 Environment (1), change name of municipality (1))
Castile and Leon 20 2 Environment (1), municipal organization (1))
Castile-La 
Mancha 9 3 Facilities (1), Local festivals (2), 
Catalonia 15 4 Town-planning (2), change name of municipality (1), Local festivals (1)
Extremadura 6 2 Facilities (1), Local festivals (1)
Galicia 3 0 -
Madrid 3 2 Facilities (1)
Murcia 2 0 -
Navarre 3 1 Environment (1) 
La Rioja 1 1 Environment (1)
Valencia 15 3 change name of municipality (1), Local festivals (2)
Ceuta 1 0 -
TOTAL 111 26  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Ministry of Public Administration.
Consultative councils are the most used mechanism of citizen participation in municipalities. 
They can be sector-specific (consejos sectoriales) or territorial (consejos territoriales). Most 
consultative councils have a plenary session meeting on a regular basis and a specific commission 
for the daily work, which produces much of the debate. All Spanish municipalities with more 
than 100,000 residents have some consultative sector-specific councils and nearly 40 per cent 
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have territorial councils. At the same time, municipalities across Spain have been experimenting 
with various mechanisms for citizen participation, especially salient in Catalonia and Andalusia 
(Font and Blanco 2006). For example, there have been innovative experiments such as the 
Council of the 100 Young in the city of Barcelona, selected randomly from the local population. 
Another experiments are Scenario Workshops which bring together a diverse group of people 
to discuss future scenarios on a given issue, to deliberate and eventually reach agreements and 
recommendations. Many municipalities hold public municipal hearings usually, as for example 
the forums that have developed in recent years within the framework of Local Agenda 21.
The practice of participatory budgeting is recent and still small-scale in several municipalities, 
but there are some experiences worthwhile mentioning. In Catalonia, it was launched in Sabadell 
in 2000 and Rubí in 2002. Other examples are found in the province and the city of Cordoba 
or Cabezas de San Juan, Albacete, and Getafe, and more recently in Seville. In this city, the 
council allocated between 32 and 42 per cent of its budget to eighteen districts; and all residents 
in the neighbourhoods voted for particular projects, social policies and actions in their area. 
Local governments have also used polls and surveys on specific aspects of municipal life, or 
deliberative polls in some Andalusian cities. According to a recent survey in middle-size cities, 
most citizens do not know or use many of the mechanisms mentioned above (Navarro 2008a).
Subnational governance
Apart from parliaments, audit courts, ombudsman offices, and economic and social councils, ACs 
in Spain have developed independent regional administrations and civil services to implement 
their policies and co-ordinate national policies with the central government’s administration. 
Most of them followed the national bureaucratic model in their departmental organization and 
concentrated powers in the regional capitals, establishing ministerial field offices over their 
territories, frequently following the traditional division in provinces. ACs with a greater number 
of powers at the beginning, the fast-track ACs, developed a more stable and professionalized 
civil service and some others have relied more on non-career-civil servants posts (Ramió and 
Salvador 2002). Many ACs have created agencies or public companies for regional economic 
development, and have independently regulated spatial planning, urbanism and land use, saving 
banks, or have set strategic plans for big cities. They have also approved regional economic 
strategies, such as Regional Pacts for the Employment, Regional Spatial Strategies, Regional 
Transport and Infrastructures Plans, etc. They have their own R+D policies, education and 
vocational training schemes, or set their own environmental standards or transport regulations 
within EU and Spanish framework directives (Colino 2008).
It appears that their institutions and resources have enabled growing, if still limited, policy and 
financial discretion by regions. Most of the revenues of ACs governments are unconditioned 
and have constantly grown in the last years. That has given them a certain capacity to implement 
innovative policy options and policy experiments. AC governments have chosen different 
public-private mixes for the provision of their services, have decided to invest more on cultural, 
eloíSa del piNo & céSar coliNo
- 27 -
linguistic or in welfare policies, on primary or secondary education, on technology or in tourism, or to 
change their priorities. Additionally, they have produced policy innovation in several programmes such 
as family assistance, housing policies, poverty assistance, environmental impact assessment, health 
care management, development aid, etc. This has led to increasing policy diversity across them in such 
important sectors as health, education, social services, or environmental policy (Gallego et al. 2005; 
Subirats 2006).
Growing demands from their populations have produced ever-growing spending on health and other 
services, which has led to diverging fiscal situations across regions. All ACs feel now in urgent 
need of additional financing. In addition, most regional administrations have been under pressure to 
modernize even more than the central government. Some processes of ‘agentization’ and contracting 
out can be observed. Many public-private partnerships have been established (Catalonia, Andalusia, 
Madrid). Additionally, several ACs have attempted systems of quality management, E-government, 
and information technologies.
As regards municipalities and the other local entities, they do not possess specific powers assigned by 
the Constitution. The central law and regional laws may assign responsibilities for several policies in 
some matters. In most cases, it is the laws of the ACs that transfer these responsibilities. According 
to their population size, they have to provide a number of basic services, such as local policing, fire 
fighting, refuse collection, street cleaning, land use control, urban transportation, social services, leisure 
and cultural activities, public works and town planning, central markets, housing, etc. Only the larger 
municipalities have a role in the delivery of services such as education or health, which are under 
AC government’s responsibility. Municipal and provincial councils have mostly secured an efficient 
delivery of public services such as water supply, waste disposal, roads and freeways maintenance; they 
have also been successful in promoting economic development at the local level (Velasco 2009). In 
metropolitan areas, public services have also been mostly successful and delivered jointly by the ACs 
administration and one or several local councils, with different levels of integration of services and 
normally managed by agencies or public companies governed by the councils (Tomàs 2005). A good 
example of this joint delivery is urban and intercity transport in the metropolitan area of Madrid.
Recently, local governments have turned to welfare state services and have had to deal with new problems 
such as environment sustainability, immigration, new technologies, and educational deprivation, 
coupled with demands for greater social participation. Often they have done this without having explicit 
jurisdiction or resources given by the other two levels. In this sense, the high number, fragmentation, 
and diversity of local governments in Spain has led to the lack of sufficient financial means and a 
chronic financial deficit, and made them dependent on other governments —central and regional— in 
order to be able to provide their services. That means that a high percentage of their expenditure is 
constituted by unfunded mandates. This has led to two typical solutions, intermunicipal co-operation, 
with the creation of horizontal service partnerships (mancomunidades) or consortia (Nieto 2007), or to 
the privatization of the delivery of important local services, such as solid waste collection and water. 
In many cases, local councils have privatized the delivery of social, cultural, and educational services 
to private companies or to the third sector NGOs, non-profit and religious organizations. Services 
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managed by private operators represented 44 per cent for municipalities between 100,000-
500,000 inhabitants (Torres et al. 2003).
At the same time, mayors and councillors have changed their styles of governing and increasingly 
learnt to interact with other public and private actors, establishing local policy networks that in 
many cases have implied the participation of stakeholders in main local policies (Blanco and 
Gomà 2002; Navarro 2008b)
Spanish Subnational democracy in the Lijphart-Hendriks typologies
Summarising the situation of subnational democracy so far, if we try to apply the existing 
models of democracy to the subnational democracies in Spain, at the regional level we find 
mostly majoritarian features albeit with some qualifications. For instance, we find concentration 
of executive power in one-party regional governments in eleven ACs, the executive dominance 
in relations between regional parliaments and governments and two-party systems or 
bipolar competition in electoral blocks in most of them. There are also centralized regional 
administrations with strong central institutions and weak sub-regional institutions and a 
concentration of regulatory powers in regional governments, with financial-economic auditing 
under regional political control. On the other hand, some consensual elements are the electoral 
system of proportional representation with fairly proportional effects; some indications of an 
interest group system that stresses regional corporatism, and finally the legal-administrative 
supervision by higher regional courts.
If we look at the local democracy, there are clear differences between large cities and small 
municipalities. But generally we may also find a majoritarian concentration of executive power 
in one-party local government, mostly supported by pluralities; increasing executive dominance 
of mayors vis-à-vis the council, a two-party system in most of the councils, and a more pluralist 
local interest group system. We also find concentration of regulatory powers, the importance 
of council sectoral committees and related bureaucracies; mostly centralized local government 
with weak sub-local institutions. On the consensus model side, we may find the proportional 
electoral system; a dispersal of regulatory powers in co-ordination with other governmental 
tiers and external financial-economic auditing with legal-administrative supervision by courts, 
with independent local auditing weakly developed.
If we add the consideration of direct forms of democracy at the subnational levels, we observe 
again an apparent gap between the rules and the reality. Despite the clear representative approach 
of subnational democracy in Spain, there are many regulations establishing the requirement 
to encourage citizens’ participation and even direct democracy in micro-municipalities. The 
introduction of many participatory mechanisms in the last ten years in many municipalities 
imply the co-existence of traditional representative democracy with a model imbued with a new 
logic. This causes great variance in practice as to the levels of compliance with these regulations 
and the use of existing mechanisms across regions and types of local governments. At the same 
eloíSa del piNo & céSar coliNo
- 29 -
time, citizens do not seem to be eager to participate. This situation produces overall a type 
of pendulum democracy at the subnational level again, even if a certain plebiscitary logic of 
voter democracy has been also visible through the intense use of consumer surveying, opinion 
polling, and public-service marketing. Other mechanisms such as Internet fora or e-democracy 
have shown elements of a more direct democratic or ‘deliberative’ logic.
4. cHalleNgeS aNd opportuNitieS of SubNatioNal democracy iN SpaiN
Subnational democracy in Spain faces several exogenous and endogenous challenges that affect 
its quality, that is, the responsiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy of governments. Some of them 
are unique to its specific configuration and evolution. Others are shared by other subnational 
units both in similar countries in Mediterranean Europe and in the rest of Europe. The response 
to these challenges implies constitutional and institutional reform proposals and policy changes 
that at the same time represent an opportunity to adapt to new social realities and policy 
problems.
The first challenge we can mention is globalization, Europeanization, and economic 
competiveness, which are three different albeit related dimensions of the exogenous challenge 
to subnational democracy. Global competition and adaptation to EU membership has been a 
challenge that has put a strain on the capacity of subnational governments to compete with each 
other in international markets for private investments and domestically for public investments 
and structural funding from central government and EU. This competition, aggravated with the 
international economic crisis has also affected big cities and metropolitan areas in Spain that 
have also competed for a new role in the global scene. For example, Madrid and Barcelona 
metropolitan areas –among the 10 biggest in Europe— have tried with different strategies to 
place their economies in the new global economy. This has had consequences for regional 
governments, which as in the case of Catalonia have demanded more resources to promote their 
economic growth and employment.
In this sense, lack of resources seems to be the main challenge for the effectiveness of subnational 
governments in Spain. Decentralization of most welfare state functions in the 1990s produced 
ever-growing spending in health and other services, aggravated by a strong increase of the 
immigrant population and related spending. Redistribution mechanisms, cohesion policies, and 
the ever-increasing cost of the welfare state, supported mostly by regional governments, become 
thus one of the more debated issues in need of reform. The fragmentation of local governments 
and the very many unfunded mandates they have been taking on, - leading some municipalities 
to virtual bankruptcy or high amounts of government debt - also calls for urgent solutions. These 
solutions have to be agreed and co-ordinated among central, regional, and local governments. 
Thus far, regional governments have been unwilling to decentralize resources and competences 
to the local tier, which has maintained the same share of public spending since the transition to 
democracy.
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Corruption in regional and local government seems to be one, if not the most serious, of the malaises 
plaguing subnational democracy in Spain. In virtually all parties and at all governmental levels, 
regional, provincial, and municipal, there have been repeated scandals in the last years. They have 
impelled legislators and judges, so far unsuccessfully, to try to address what seems to be a structural 
phenomenon. It has its causes in the afore-mentioned lack of resources of subnational governments, the 
increasing financial needs of political parties, and the real estate boom that Spain experienced in recent 
times. Most of the corruption scandals have involved regional governments, presidents and deputies, 
and both small towns and large cities like Madrid. Many of the corruption cases revolve around the 
irregular funding of parties and work in several ways. Some involve donations from large companies, 
credit debt write-offs from banks, or the use of regional or local public administrations to channel 
funds to the party controlling it, by charging commissions from the awarding of public procurement 
or in exchange for certain urban development decisions or permits (Fundación Alternativas 2007). The 
pervasive party politicization of the higher echelons of both regional and local administrations and 
the ineffectiveness of audit and other supervision mechanisms aggravates the situation. In 2009, the 
European Parliament (Auken Report) severely criticized land speculation and other irregularities in 
Spain, rampant sprawl and urbanization programmes, especially at the seaside.
In other cases, accusations of the squander of public moneys by regional presidents and ministers have 
caught the attention of the media. Finally, a last source of corruption at the regional and local level has 
been the ‘turncoat’ phenomenon. For example, the two regional turncoat deputies in Madrid in 2003, 
who were allegedly bribed and refused to vote the investiture of their own party leader, forcing the 
regional parliament of Madrid to repeat regional elections. This prevented the left coalition that won 
the elections from forming a government. Many cases of turncoat councillors have also occurred at the 
municipal level, and main state-wide parties tried to agree a national pact against this phenomenon that 
has subsequently not been honoured. In any case, one of the most worrying developments related to 
corruption is that public opinion and voters in general do not seem to seek retribution against politicians 
or governing parties after these have been suspect of corruption and in most cases have re-elected 
candidates involved in corruption cases. For some observers, this lack of retribution occurs most 
frequently among conservative voters. High party bipolarization and the political culture of extended 
cynicism of voters towards politicians may explain this (Fundación Alternativas 2007).
This creates a climate in public opinion and attitudes that undoubtedly lead to political disaffection and 
to increasing levels of abstention and cynicism. In some ACs, such as Catalonia, increasing disaffection 
has brought about a debate about its causes and solutions. This debate has intensified with the decreasing 
participation in regional and local elections, and in the referendums on the new Statutes of Autonomy 
in both Catalonia and Andalusia —with 48 and 36 per cent turnout respectively, alongside other signs 
of citizen discontent regarding the political system and politicians (Vallès 2008).
However, if corruption and disaffection are severe problems of subnational democracy in Spain, still 
more serious for its survival is the problem, currently unique in Europe, of the persistence of political 
violence and nationalist terrorism in the Basque Country and in Navarre, affecting indirectly the rest 
of the country. The terrorist organization (ETA), which has a sizeable (albeit decreasing) support of the 
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population, has sought independence of the Basque Country and annexation of Basque lands in 
France and Navarre. It has done this through the killing of nearly 900 people and dividing the 
population in the Basque Country (Mansvelt-Beck 2008). According to data from El País, from 
1995 onwards, almost 30 per cent of the killed have been political adversaries —local town 
councillors (16), party leaders or ex-leaders from non-nationalist parties (5), officials (5). In 
2008 alone, there were thirty-eight terrorist attacks, of which eight were bomb-cars, with four 
people killed and sixty-four injured.
In many areas of the Basque Country, non-nationalists cannot campaign freely in elections, 
and dozens of journalists and thousands of other professionals have been forced into self-exile 
through fear and persecution. Most non-nationalist politicians, local councillors and MPs, and 
their families in the ACs of the Basque Country and Navarre, must live with round-the-clock 
bodyguards. That means that rights to freedom of expression or representation are denied in 
that region to many citizens (Mata 2005; Gil-Robles 2005). Parties supporting violence have 
until recently enjoyed regional parliamentary seats and governed many municipalities without 
condemning or criticizing violence against their fellow councillors or deputies. At the same 
time, they have controlled more than sixty local councils, which have been used as a major 
source of income and patronage to support the terrorist organization.
Finally, regional and local governments have to face the challenge of integration and management 
of old and new diversities. Apart from the smaller participation of women in political offices 
and other inequalities, immigration in Spain has increased dramatically in the last ten years, 
from 6 to 12 per cent of total population. Cities like Barcelona have now 18.1 per cent of 
foreign residents. Muslim and Latin American immigrants have been the most numerous, and 
their distribution has varied in different regions. ACs with double national identities and two 
languages have felt the integration of immigrants as an additional hurdle in their particular 
integration and nation-building projects. On certain occasions, immigration has led to acts of 
racism and xenophobia. In Catalonia, for example, some extreme right parties have emerged 
(e.g. Plataforma per Catalunya) that campaign against Muslim immigration and have had 
electoral success in local elections in several municipalities.
5. reSpoNdiNg to tHe cHalleNgeS aNd opportuNitieS
Most of these challenges have been addressed through institutional reforms and policy changes 
carried out by the central parliaments and governments or through co-ordination of the three 
governmental levels. That does not mean that most of them have been addressed adequately. 
Many are complex structural problems that require the combined action of many actors and 
even a change in public attitudes. The demands of globalization, Europeanization, and the lack 
of resources have been mainly dealt with through legal and policy reforms to promote co-
ordination, collaborative government and increased political and fiscal autonomy of subnational 
units, alongside reforms in public management at the three levels in the direction of more 
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evaluation and accountability of public activity. A new funding system for regional governments is 
currently being negotiated that achieves more revenue autonomy and responsibility of governments. 
Co-operation bodies for vertical and horizontal co-ordination both in domestic and EU affairs have been 
created or reinforced, such as the Conference of Presidents or the new horizontal bodies to promote and 
co-ordinate subnational participation in EU decision-making.
Regarding the overdue reform of local government and its financial problems, several reform measures 
have been implemented since 1999 within the so-called Local Pact among the main parties. Based 
on a 2005 White Paper on Local Government, the government drafted a bill that tried to clarify and 
expand local jurisdiction and the financial resources available to local governments and to strengthen 
democracy at the local level. Other proposals have advocated the reinforcement of intermunicipal co-
operation or the amalgamation of some existing micro-municipalities. Still others have been defending 
the direct election of the mayor. This proposal, despite being supported by some in the ruling Socialist 
Party, has not reached sufficient consensus among politicians and experts thus far. In view of corruption 
at the municipal level, uncontrolled urban sprawl, and environmental deterioration of coastal zones, 
many have proposed introducing new regional powers of legal control over local governments, at least 
the smaller ones.
The central government has also been committed to a programme of ‘Regeneration of Democracy’ in 
recent years that includes the integration of minorities and the extension of rights and civic education. 
It has introduced “Education for Citizenship and Human Rights” in secondary education, opposed 
by the conservative party (PP) and the Church. It has promoted the equality of women in political 
representation in public offices, through quotas in party lists. The 2007 Organic Law for Effective 
Equality between Women and Men has established that candidate lists must now have a balanced 
presence of women and men, with each sex accounting for at least 40 per cent. Due to this law, female 
participation in local elected offices has increased, compared with local elections in 2003, with a 17 per 
cent rise in the number of women mayors and a 23 per cent rise in the number of women councillors. 
The central parliament also legalized same-sex marriage.
On the other hand, an opportunity has been lost to democratize the internal workings of parties with the 
Law on Political Parties in 2002. The government has also relinquished the traditional governmental 
control of public television and radio by the executive, transferring to the parliament the appointment 
of the director of the national public television corporation. Unfortunately, regional executives have 
not followed this path in their publicly controlled media.
Finally, the government has advanced, with the support of some left and nationalist forces, the 
recognition of the victims of dictatorship and historic memory through the ‘Reparation Law’ or the ‘Law 
of Historical Memory’, as it is usually known in the media. This law recognizes the victims on both 
sides of the Spanish Civil War, and is the first legal pronouncement condemning the dictatorship since 
the return of democracy (Aguilar 2008). It has ensured moral compensation for victims of repression, 
provided for the removal of francoist symbols from public buildings and spaces, and committed the 
government to help in the tracing, identification, and eventual exhumation of victims of Francoist 
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repression whose corpses are still missing, often buried in mass graves. It has also meant a 
change to Spanish citizenship regulations, granting citizenship to those who left Spain under 
Franco for political or economic reasons and their descendants.
However, the principal set of measures to regenerate democracy has been those addressed to fight 
corruption and promote transparency. This has been done through the change of party finance 
regulations, a law regulating conflict-of-interest cases for high officials, and the promulgation of 
a Code of Good Governance for members of the central government, who must act in accordance 
with a series of ethical principles. These two regulations were limited to central administrators, 
although some regional governments had proposed similar initiatives within the framework 
of their jurisdiction. Municipalities so far have not developed a code of ethics specific to their 
officials, but the national Association of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP) is currently 
developing a code of conduct for the Councils. The Anti-corruption prosecutor of the Public 
Prosecutors Office has also been re-organized and some specialized judges created. Other anti-
corruption measures have targeted those areas most prone to corruption, party funding, public 
procurement and contracting, and land use and planning. The 2007 Land use Law increases 
the limits for local public authorities to change urban plans and grant building or development 
permits (Fundación Alternativas 2008).
Regional and local governments have also taken several measures to fight citizens’ disaffection 
and lack of involvement in political life. They have done that partly through the promotion 
of more direct democracy and public participation in ACs and municipalities. To mention 
an example, based on the reform of its new statute of autonomy, the Catalan government 
has proposed a new bill on regional referendums. This proposal makes Catalonia the first 
AC to promote the calling of referendums on sensitive political issues. They can be held if 
requested by 3 per cent of the Catalan population, proposed by the regional government, the 
Catalan president, one fifth of MPs or two parliamentary groups. Also 10 per cent of Catalan 
municipalities (about ninety-five) representing at least half a million people, may request the 
convening of a referendum. Parliament must approve any proposal by an absolute majority. The 
central government, according to the constitutional distribution of powers, will have the final 
say to authorise the referendum, whose results will not be binding.
The FEMP has also developed on its part a standard regulation or agenda for public participation 
with forty-five lines of action. These are related to municipal organization, the strengthening of 
partnerships, the associative network in municipalities, the training of citizens to exercise the 
right to participate and/or their involvement in civic associations, and the co-ordination with 
regional and central governments to promote civic participation.
Finally, terrorist and political violence in the Basque Country has been addressed through 
a combination of a ban on violent parties, social isolation of violent groups and attempts to 
establish political negotiations with terrorists. By means of the 2002 Law on Political Parties, 
the Spanish parliament decided to ban those parties clearly linked with the terrorist organization 
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ETA and advocating violence. Accordingly, legitimate grounds for such a ban include, among 
other things, “giving express or tacit political support, legitimizing terrorist actions or excusing 
and minimizing their significance”, providing institutional or economic support to those 
who carry out such actions, and helping to create a ‘culture of confrontation’ that infringes 
the fundamental rights of those who take a contrary view (Bale 2007). Despite some political 
and legal controversy and the opposition of ruling Basque nationalist parties, the law proved 
somewhat effective in reducing terrorist resources and weaken their room for manoeuvre. 
Some rulings of the Constitutional Court have meanwhile specified the scope of the ban and 
recognized the law’s exceptional character, establishing the conditions to recover legality —for 
example by proving the party’s independence of ETA through a simple condemnation of terrorist 
attacks—. Recently in June 2009, the European Court of Human Rights has also upheld the ban 
on Batasuna and other parties supporting terrorism in the Basque Country, who had appealed 
the Spanish courts’ rulings.
ETA’s ceasefire in 2006 raised hopes of a long-term peace and incited the Zapatero government 
to conduct direct talks with ETA. This was deeply controversial and divisive among the main 
political parties and public opinion. With violence back in the scene, the central government 
has utilized again all means in the Law on Political Parties to ban dozens of candidates of 
ANV (Basque National Action) and PCTV (Basque Homeland Communist Party), the legal 
successors of ETA’s now illegal political branch, from taking part in 2007 local elections in 
the Basque Country. Also in March 2009, for the first time in democracy, parties supporting 
terrorism were banned from participating in Basque regional elections, which has resulted in 
the first ever alternation of the Basque government in thirty years.
6. coNcluSioNS
The Spanish model of subnational democracy, it has been argued in this chapter, has evolved 
parallel to the consolidation of the first successful experience of liberal democracy occurred 
at the national level during the last thirty years in Spain. Democracy at the subnational level 
has been influenced by the state tradition, but at the same time has transformed its structure 
and the behaviour of political actors from a consensual towards a more majoritarian model. 
This has been done alongside far-reaching decentralization and the emergence of particular 
regional democratic institutions, party systems, welfare state policies and the recovering of 
local self-government. Democracy, identified with autonomy from the start, has provided 
cultural-political recognition, social integration, and economic development for most of the 
newly created autonomous communities and other local representative governments. At the 
same time, the building of subnational democratic institutions and governance systems has 
been dominated by ACs to the detriment of local entities. 
The type of Spanish democracy has served to overcome traditional cleavages present in Spanish 
society since long, and has guaranteed political stability, improved governance and respect 
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for minorities. On the other hand, due to the manner in which it emerged and to some unique 
characteristics of Spanish history and political culture, democracy both at the national and the 
subnational level has suffered from some shortcomings in terms of their capacity to promote 
and channel citizens’ participation in the public sphere. Despite the apparent willingness of the 
founding fathers and subsequent regulations at the national and subnational level to promote a 
participatory democracy, Spaniards have been reluctant in practice to make use of participation 
mechanisms and to get involved in politics. The consequences of this fact for the quality of 
democracy and governance in Spain remain controversial.
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